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The study was aimed to examine the cases of tax dispute in Indonesia. This study will be identified the behavior of verdicts of the Supreme Court, especially indications of tax avoidance by taxpayer and identify the governments loss due to tax avoidance. The data use the verdicts of the Supreme Court regarding to tax disputes in the Supreme Court. Using logistic regression, this study revealed that taxpayer was facilitated to commit tax avoidance by the legal loopholes. The motivation of taxpayers in committing tax avoidance was to utilize the time during the dispute process in accordance to postpone the taxes payment. Delaying tax payment by applying the dispute, taxpayer get benefit from time value of money. From the analysis was, the Indonesian tax laws, some how, provides opportunities for taxpayers to perform tax avoidance. Moreover, the study showed that the tax laws have not been implemented properly. Accordingly, the loss opportunity cost of the government due to tax avoidance by the taxpayers was approximately 10 billion rupiah. Therefore, based on the result of the study, we advised the government of Indonesia to do some policies, which are: 1) describe the legislation and taxation system with an objective definition; 2) designing administrative processes that can detect the tax avoidance, which is more stringent administrative processes; 3) shorten the processing of a tax dispute.
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Act Number 16 Year 2000 concerning the Second Revision on Act Number 6 Year 1983 concerning General Provisions and Tax Procedures.
Act Number 28 Year 2007 concerning the Third Revision on Act Number 6 Year 1983 concerning General Provisions and Tax Procedures.
Act Number 6 Year 1983 concerning General Provisions and Tax Procedures.
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